The main purpose of this research is to evaluate the effect of family control over the profit management in the listed companies on the Stock Exchange in Tehran. In this research, the profit management is considered as the dependent variable and the control of the company is considered as the independent variable. Dechow and Dichev and Kothari Models have been used to measure the profit management. In addition, a dummy variable is used to measure the company's control. The research population is the listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange and the sample consisted of 32 family firms that were selected using systematic elimination 
INTRODUCTION
Ownership structure is different (Hussaini, 1390). Ownership structure is classified into four classes: 1.Institutional ownership, 2.Corporate ownership, 3. Management ownership, 4.Foreign ownership. Management investors are family firms that the majority of ownership is possessed by a family or group family (Standard, 1390) . In other words, family firms have been recognized as an organization that is managed and controlled by several family members (Zehir et al., 2011) . Family members have ownership concentration and they are the member of the board of directors and management team (Cheng, 2014) . Leadership and management of a company in itself are difficult and it becomes more difficult when the board members, shareholders, and business consultants want better control of the company. Control and monitoring the family-owned businesses is more difficult than companies whose owners are strange. In family businesses, both families and homeowners interested in monitoring and controlling or dominating. In family businesses, the lack of effective governance is the main cause of organizational problems (Farmer, 2011) . Most studies related to family firms have been focused on the agency conflict framework (Change, 2014). Based on agency theory, the conflict of interests concerns the owners (shareholders) so that they assess the performance of managers to ensure the optimum allocation of resources by the management. Over time, it has been found that some management decisions may be a waste of resources and loss of owners' wealth. On the other hand, managers are always seeking to ensure the owners that their decision is in the interests of the owners in addition to maximize their benefits (AkbariGhoroghchi, 2011) . Regarding family firms, family members are the manager and the owner of a part of the company stock. Therefore, these people are both the owner and the agency. No problem will be created in the relationship of the agency and the owner until the company be looked from this view. However, it should be noticed that in some companies, other people are the stockholder in addition to family members, but they have no any management positions. Therefore, it is possible that family members of the Board of Directors act as the detriment of other shareholders and increase their wealth in this way (NaderiNayeri, 2013) . According to accounting theory, the main purpose of profit reporting is providing useful information for people who are most interested in the financial statements. Assuming that, management thinks of its own interests, managers may manipulate managers may manipulate, or in other words, manage the profit to gain the greatest benefits. Profit has an important role as an appropriate index in investors' decision-making. Given that, managers are able to give misleading information to the users by manipulating profit and profit management is a means to manipulate profits by manager, the ownership structures need to pay more attention and the provided information need to be analyzed (Mehrazin et al. 2013) . Therefore, based on the mentioned cases, it is necessary to examine profit management in family firms. Finally, this research seeks to answer the question that whether the family control affects profit management practices. 
Theoretical Principles and research literature

The life cycle of family firms
Generally, family firms have three phases in their life cycle:
First generation: In this generation of family firms, one or more people are the owners and shareholders. These shareholders form both the board of directors and the management team.
This leads to simplicity and ease of work, but the lack of distinction between ownership and management may make the work difficult for independent people and they prefer to leave the company.
Second generation:
In this generation, there are usually several owners, but they all have a contribution rate. Less activeowners enter the Board or only participate in plenary sessions, but active shareholders managethe company. In this situation, there is often disagreement about business strategy.
Third Generation: The third-generation family firms often are bigger and require professional management. The required consensus, competition, and ambition may not be found among family members; therefore, there is an urgent need to manage from outside the family.
Managing the firm at this stage is very complicated and leads to conflict.
The Board of Directors in family firms
The 
The Foundation of Profit Management
The main role of financial reporting is transferring the financial information to persons outside the organization in an appropriate and on time way. In doing so, the mangers have opportunities in the financial reporting to judge. The managers could make use of their knowledge about the financial activities to promote the efficacy of financial statements as a tool to transfer information to the shareholders and potential creditors. Notwithstanding this, if the managers intend to mislead the users of financial statements (inside or outside the organization) through using their power in the accounting selections in financial statements, profit management may occur (NaderiNiri, 2013). Hilly and Helen (1999) state that the profit management occurs only when the mangers make use of their subjective judgments in the financial reporting and manipulate the structure of transactions for the aim of changing the financial reporting. This aim is either to mislead some of the profit owners concerning the economic performance of the firm or to affect the results of transactions whose conclusions depend on achieving personal profit (Royai and Mohammadi, 2011). Involving family members in management allows them to have a wide range of information on company operations. As a result, family members can be able to have flexible, timely, and effective decisions. Since family members control the company's operations, so the company is dominant. According to the entrenchment effect, the owner may engage in transactions that involve their personal interests. Since the owners have control over the company's financial reports, they are able to manage their accounting data for their personal purposes. Since, they are concerned with their families' reputation, so they provide high quality profits to protect the family reputation (Abdul-Manaf et al., 2013). Considering the aforementioned principles, to achieve the main objective of the study, the following hypotheses have been proposed and In this study, after analyzing all the firms accepted in the stock exchange, 31 firms found to be family based. Then, they were separated to different industries. Next, following the same number of firms and the same industries, other firms were randomly chosen and were categorized as non-family firms. The modified model of Jones was taken into consideration for examining the research hypotheses as well as calculating the profit management. The overall results showed that there was a significant relation between the structure of the firm ownership and profit management and the non-family firms exercise more profit management.
Control of family business and its impact on profit management
METHOD
Research Design
Methodologically speaking, this study is applied. The research is also naturalistic as it examines the relation between the variables in their natural forms and without any manipulation. Thus, it puts the study in the category of correctional study.
Population and Sample
To gather information related to the literature, a library research approach was used. The population of this study involves all the firms accepted in Tehran Stock Exchange and to select the samples a systematic sampling technique was employed. The sample of the study, by considering, the said limitations and the variable of control of the firm (through examining the board of directors and the board of supervisors), 32 firms were selected from the firms accepted in Tehran Stock Exchange.
Data Collection
To collect the data, the RahavardNovin and the official website of Tehran Stock Exchanges were taken into account. To computerize the data, the Eviews software program was employed and to test the hypotheses of the study, the correlation and regression analyses through the Panel Data were used. In what follows, the research models and variables are introduced.
Evaluating the Variables The Model Determining the Relation between the Discretionary Accruals (Profit
Management) and Firm Control
In the current study, the multiple regression, which is the main model of study, was employed to examine the effects of family control on profit management actions. PPE  = Net property, machinery, and equipment i in year t.
Model (1)
ROA  = Return on assets (net income divided by average total assets) for i in year t-1.
AT  = Total assets of company i in year t-1.
∆CA  = Change in current assets from year t-1 to the year t.
∆Cash  = Change in cash and cash equivalents of year t-1 to year t.
∆CL  = Change in current debt of year t-1 to year t.
∆STD  = Change in current portion of long-term debt from year t-1 to year t.
Dep  = Amortization expense of fixed and intangible assets in year t.
laggedAT= Total assets of company i in year t-1.
To calculate the non-discretionary accruals, themodified Jones model is acted by adding ROA as follows:
∆ REC  = Change in net accounts and commercial receivables of company i in the year t.
And finally, to obtain discretionary accruals (DACC  ), total accruals (TACC  ) is deducted to non-discretionary accruals (NDACC  ) as follows:
RESEARCH FINDINGS Hypotheses Analysis Hypothesis 1 (H1)
In order to test the hypothesis, a pre-test is needed to be conducted. In this paper, the Chow test is used to determine the cross fixed and time constant effects that its scale should be smaller than 0.05. Since, in this paper, the probability is smaller than 0.05, the cross fixed effects are confirmed and the time constant effects are rejected. In order to determine the random-effects and fixed-effects, Hausman test is used. If the probability is smaller than 0.05, the random-effects are rejected and the fixed-effects are confirmed. According to the conducted tests, the fixed effects are confirmed. The results of hypothesis testing in this method are presented in Table 2 . The probability (Prob) 
Hypothesis 2 (H2)
The results of hypothesis testing in this method are presented in Table 3 . The probability (Prob) Thus, these variables aresignificant at a confidence level of 99% and 95%, respectively.
Considering the significance, the company control variable (CCO), which is the main variable of the model in confirming or rejecting the hypothesis, it can be claimed that the family relations are effective in the Board of Directors on profit management (Kothari model).
Therefore, according to the results, the second hypothesis is confirmed.
Discussion and Conclusion:
The results of the first hypothesis showed that family relations are effective in the Board of 
